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I. INTRODUCTION

Providing and maintaining an education system is one of the most
important functions of state and local governments.1 Few would dispute
† President of the Ohio Senate; Of Counsel, Squire Patton Boggs (US) LLP; J.D.,
Yale Law School; B.A., The Ohio State University. The views expressed in this article are
solely those of the author.
1. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954) (“[E]ducation is perhaps
the most important function of state and local governments.”); see also Wisconsin v.
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213 (1972) (“Providing public schools ranks at the very apex of the
function of a State.”); Melissa C. Carr & Susan H. Fuhrman, The Politics of School
Finance in the 1990s, in EQUITY AND ADEQUACY IN EDUCATION FINANCE: ISSUES AND
PERSPECTIVES 136, 136 (Helen F. Ladd et al. eds., 1999) (“Education is one of the most
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that fact. Educational attainment is linked to students’ long-term economic
success and to the social mobility that has marked economic progress in
the United States and around the globe. Parents know this instinctively.
We want our children to do well in school, to learn as much as possible,
and to have the best possible opportunities as they grow older.
In my experience as a state legislator, I have found that policymakers
largely want the same things for the people they represent. One of my
colleagues in the state senate is fond of saying that “children are thirty
percent of our population, but they are one hundred percent of our
future.”2 His point is well-taken. It is important not only that your own
children receive a quality education and have better economic
opportunities, but that all children do. Your children (and mine) will live
in the world populated by their peers. Presumably, most of us want our
own children to live in a society where others also are living up to their
fullest potential: where people are well-educated or well-trained for
economic opportunities,3 where citizens are able to choose (and serve as)
responsible public officials,4 and where upward mobility helps overcome
barriers such as race and class.5
Thus, I start with two propositions. First, that most people view
education as both a private and a public good. Second, that most
policymakers share the broad-based goal of providing a quality education.
Things break down from there.
Policymaking is not as simple as asking, “Do you think children
should have quality educational opportunities?” It involves a host of other
questions and competing interests. What constitutes a quality education?
How does one provide it? How much do specific inputs, like money,
important investments that a state can make in the future of its individual citizens and of the
society as a whole.”).
2. This is an often-used quote from the Minority Leader of the Ohio Senate, State
Senator Kenny Yuko. Although I have not independently verified his math, the rhetorical
force of his point appears to resonate with our constituents.
3. See Larry J. Obhof, Rethinking Judicial Activism and Restraint in State School
Finance Litigation, 27 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 569, 570 (2004) [hereinafter Rethinking]
(“The economic benefits that a society gains from having well-trained and educated
workers are well known.”); Elizabeth Reilly, Education and the Constitution: Shaping Each
Other and the Next Century, 34 AKRON L. REV. 1, 2 (2000) (“Our economic system []
proclaims its reliance upon well-trained and educated workers.”).
4. See Brown, 347 U.S. at 493 (“[Education] is required in the performance of our
most basic public responsibilities . . . . It is the very foundation of good citizenship.”).
5. See Reilly, supra note 3, at 2–3 (“And our social system rests on two largely
accepted goals that each require access to education—the ‘melting pot’ which requires the
successful absorption of diverse immigrant populations into a pluralistic social and cultural
structure, and ‘upward mobility’ which requires the permeability of class barriers.”).
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make a difference in achieving this goal? What other public policy
concerns are weighed against education in the competition for limited
resources? These and many other questions combine into the overall
discussion that policymakers must undertake.
Who are the proper persons to answer these questions? Or perhaps
more pointedly, which is the proper branch of government to make these
determinations? Many would say these policymaking functions belong to
the legislative or executive branches—the branches charged by state
constitutions with policymaking authority. Importantly though, most state
constitutions contain a requirement to provide for some “common” or
“thorough” or “efficient” system of schools, or some other language
making government responsible for providing education.6 It is a court’s
responsibility, when presented with a proper case or controversy, to
determine whether a constitutional requirement like this has been
violated.7
Thus, for decades we have seen lawsuits across the country, filed by
plaintiffs seeking to invalidate their states’ school funding schemes or
increase funding for primary and secondary education.8 Many of these
cases have succeeded; some rightly so. But rightly or wrongly, when a
court strikes down a school funding formula or seeks to impose a remedy
of its own, it intrudes upon the functions of the other branches of
government. Which begs another question: when confronted with a
6. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 111–12 (1973)
(Marshall, J., dissenting) (“[I]n 48 of our 50 States the provision of public education is
mandated by the state constitution.”); Paula J. Lundberg, State Courts and School Funding:
A Fifty-State Analysis, 63 ALB. L. REV. 1101, 1107 (2000) (“Forty-eight state constitutions
include some provision regarding the state’s duty to educate . . . .”); Matt Brooker,
Comment, Riding the Third Wave of School Finance Litigation: Navigating Troubled
Waters, 75 UMKC L. REV. 183, 189 (2006) (“Nearly all states . . . impose some duty on
the state legislature to maintain or provide for public education.”); Madeline Davis,
Comment, Off the Constitutional Map: Breaking the Endless Cycle of School Finance
Litigation, 16 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 117, 122–23 (2016) (“All states have imposed upon
themselves positive constitutional duties to maintain education.”).
7. Notwithstanding my own concerns about judicial encroachment on legislative
authority, I have previously argued that some level of judicial review is appropriate when
plaintiffs challenge the constitutionality of a school funding scheme. See Rethinking, supra
note 3, at 575 (“[I]t is the responsibility of courts to interpret their state’s constitution and
determine whether or not the finance schemes at issue meet the constitutional
requirements.”).
8. For some general background on the history of school finance litigation, see
William S. Koski, Beyond Dollars? The Promises and Pitfalls of the Next Generation of
Educational Rights Litigation, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 1897, 1901–07 (2017); Joshua E.
Weishart, Transcending Equality Versus Adequacy, 66 STAN. L. REV. 477, 500–03 (2014);
Brooker, supra note 6, at 184–88.
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constitutional challenge to a school funding system, what should a court
do? Even if we agree that courts can invalidate a funding scheme under the
right circumstances, there remains the separate question of what those
circumstances are.
When I looked at these issues roughly fifteen years ago, I reviewed a
range of state supreme court cases and compared the outcomes in those
cases to the education clauses they were interpreting. I found at the time
that “the constitutional language itself is sometimes less important than a
court’s will to reach a specific outcome.”9 Some courts addressed
challenges brought under fairly strong constitutional language, yet they
found the issues non-justiciable or otherwise ruled against the plaintiffs.10
Other courts relied on comparatively weak constitutional provisions to
order broad public policy changes.11 Still others engaged in substantive
policymaking that appears to fall outside of the funding questions actually
presented by the litigation.12 I found this pattern troubling then, and I still
do today.
This article addresses the significant separation of powers issues
raised by school finance litigation. It provides an overview of such litigation
over the past several decades, including developing trends away from
9. Rethinking, supra note 3, at 572. In the time since then, others have found no
correlation between state courts’ decisions in school finance litigation and those states’
constitutional provisions regarding the separation of powers. See, e.g., Scott R. Bauries, Is

There an Elephant in the Room?: Judicial Review of Educational Adequacy and the
Separation of Powers, 61 ALA. L. REV. 701, 701 (2010) (finding “no evidence of any
association” between “the explicitness of a state’s constitutional text relating to separation of
powers and the decision of the state’s courts whether to engage in merits adjudication of
educational adequacy claims”).
10. See, e.g., Comm. for Educ. Rights v. Edgar, 672 N.E.2d 1178, 1193 (Ill. 1996)
(interpreting a strong education clause but holding that the question of whether the state’s
schools were “high quality” was “outside the sphere of the judicial function”); City of
Pawtucket v. Sundlun, 662 A.2d 40, 57 (R.I. 1995) (stating that the legislature has “virtually
unreviewable discretion” in the area of school finance); see generally William E. Thro, A
New Approach to State Constitutional Analysis in School Finance Litigation, 14 J.L. &
POL. 525, 542 (1998) (arguing that “courts in Georgia and Illinois . . . refused to enforce
the clear commands of the state constitution”).
11. See, e.g., Brigham v. State, 692 A.2d 384 (Vt. 1997) (relying on a weak
constitutional provision to hold the state’s school funding system unconstitutional). See
generally Thro, supra note 10, at 540–41 (“On the activist side, the courts in Alabama,
Arizona, Connecticut, Massachusetts, Nebraska, New York, North Carolina, Tennessee,
and Vermont found a quality standard or a fundamental right even though the relevant
constitutional text simply establishes a system of education.”).
12. See Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 212 (Ky. 1989)
(setting out substantive policy goals that schools must achieve, including seven “capabilities”
that students must obtain).
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funding and into other areas beyond school finance.13 It looks at the
varying approaches taken by courts deciding such cases and examines the
relationship (or lack thereof) between the courts’ decisions and the actual
constitutional language that they are interpreting.14 This article advocates
for a better balancing of judicial review against the legislature’s role as the
primary policymaker in school finance legislation and budgeting.15
While I have written about this subject before, much has happened
in the subsequent years.16 Litigants are moving beyond school finance and
focusing instead on more discrete issues like teacher tenure.17 I now also
have the added perspective of leading a state senate and engaging in the
natural tug-of-war with the other branches of state government over the
proper scope of each branch’s authority. I believe that this article therefore
offers a unique view of the issues, as my longstanding academic interest in
school funding combines with my experiences as a legislative leader.
II. THE HISTORY OF SCHOOL FINANCE LITIGATION
There has been some form of school finance litigation in more than
forty states.18 My home state of Ohio is no stranger to this conflict. Most
recently, Ohio courts dealt with litigation from 1991 to 2003, with the
Ohio Supreme Court issuing several decisions holding the state’s school
funding scheme unconstitutional.19

13. See infra Part II.
14. See infra Part III.
15. See infra Part IV.
16. See Rethinking, supra note 3, at 569.
17. See, e.g., Vergara v. State, 209 Cal. Rptr. 3d 532, 538 (Cal. Ct. App. 2016)
(rejecting a claim that California’s tenure rules result in ineffective teachers being assigned
to economically disadvantaged students and therefore deny those students equal
protection). See generally Michele Aronson, Note, The Deceptive Promise of Vergara:
Why Teacher Tenure Lawsuits Will Not Improve Student Achievement, 37 CARDOZO L.
REV. 393 (2015) (discussing lawsuits related to teacher tenure).
18. See Joy Chia & Sarah A. Seo, Battle of the Branches: The Separation of Powers
Doctrine in State Education Funding Suits, 41 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 125, 125–26
(2007) (indicating that plaintiffs “have initiated lawsuits in forty-five states to challenge
methods for allocating funds for public schools and to demand reforms such as remedial
legislation . . . and increased appropriations”); Davis, supra note 6, at 125–26 (noting that
“court decisions on school finance matters have been issued in forty-four of the fifty
states”).
19. For a case study of Ohio’s school finance litigation, and the state legislature’s
contemporaneous responses to it, see Larry J. Obhof, DeRolph v. State and Ohio’s Long
Road to an Adequate Education, 2005 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 83 (2005) [hereinafter Adequate
Education].
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The prevalence of impact litigation related to school funding is
unsurprising. Nearly every state imposes some duty on its legislature to
maintain or provide for public education.20 These requirements vary
widely in strength.21 Some state constitutions simply direct the legislature to
provide for some system of public education.22 Others require the state to
provide a system that is “thorough and efficient.”23 Still others declare
education to be a “paramount duty”24 or a “fundamental goal”25 or
mandate that the state provide for a “high quality” education system.26
These constitutional provisions provide the basis for litigation. The
imposition of a duty on the state government implies a corresponding right
by citizens to the fulfillment of that duty.27 Consistent with this view, most
20. See Lundberg, supra note 6, at 1107; Brooker, supra note 6, at 189; Davis, supra
note 6, at 122–23.
21. Some observers have attempted to categorize the various states’ education clauses
by the relative strength and specificity of their text. These are typically broken down into
either three or four categories. For example, William Thro has divided state education
clauses into several categories: (1) “establishment provisions” which simply require the
establishment of a public school system; (2) “quality provisions” which mandate an
education system of a specific quality; and (3) “high duty provisions” that place education
above other governmental functions. See Thro, supra note 10, at 539–40; see also Gershon
M. Ratner, A New Legal Duty for Urban Public Schools: Effective Education in Basic
Skills, 63 TEX. L. REV. 777, 814–16 (1985); Brooker, supra note 6, at 189–200.
22. See, e.g., CONN. CONST. art. VIII, § 1 (“There shall always be free public
elementary and secondary schools in the state. The general assembly shall implement this
principle by appropriate legislation.”); N.Y. CONST. art. XI, § 1 (“The legislature shall
provide for the maintenance and support of a system of free common schools, wherein all
the children of this state may be educated.”).
23. See, e.g., MD. CONST. art. VIII, § 1 (“The General Assembly . . . shall by Law
establish throughout the State a thorough and efficient System of Free Public Schools; and
shall provide by taxation, or otherwise, for their maintenance.”); PA. CONST. art. III, § 14
(“The General Assembly shall provide for the maintenance and support of a thorough and
efficient system of public education . . . .”).
24. See WASH. CONST. art. IX, § 1 (“It is the paramount duty of the state to make
ample provision for the education of all children residing within its borders . . . .”).
25. ILL. CONST. art. X, § 1 (“A fundamental goal of the People of the State is the
educational development of all persons to the limits of their capacities. The State shall
provide for an efficient system of high quality public educational institutions and services.”).
26. See FLA. CONST. art. IX, § 1(a) (“The education of children is a fundamental
value of the people of the State of Florida. It is, therefore, a paramount duty of the state to
make adequate provision for the education of all children residing within its borders.
Adequate provision shall be made by law for a uniform, efficient, safe, secure, and high
quality system of free public schools that allows students to obtain a high quality education
. . . .”).
27. See Richard E. Levy, Gunfight at the K-12 Corral: Legislative vs. Judicial Power
in the Kansas School Finance Litigation, 54 U. KAN. L. REV. 1021, 1066–67 (2006)
(“[D]uties and rights are opposing sides of a single, legal relationship; i.e., the recognition of
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courts have interpreted their states’ education clauses “as creating judicially
enforceable constitutional rights.”28 Plaintiffs—often including students,
their parents, or the school districts themselves—therefore view the courts
as a potential vehicle for increases in school funding.
Commentators have generally divided school finance litigation into
three “waves.”29 The first two waves focused on achieving greater
educational “equity.”30 This often meant an attempt to equalize funding for
school districts within a given state. Third wave litigation has focused less
on funding disparities and more on the sufficiency of school funding
overall. These cases generally ask whether a state’s funding system meets a
minimally-acceptable standard for all districts.31
The strategy of pursuing litigation has been met with mixed results
but has spurred substantial new investments in education in many states.
Through the first three waves of such litigation, around two-dozen courts
of last resort upheld their states’ school funding systems. In nearly twenty
cases, however, courts relied on their states’ education clauses or equal
protection clauses to hold a school finance system unconstitutional.32
These include several states, such as Ohio, in which courts had previously
rejected challenges to their states’ school finance systems.33
a legal duty in A implies a corresponding right in B, and vice versa.”); see also Brooker,
supra note 6, at 189 (“Educational clauses provide a positive right that requires the
government to affirmatively provide something to its citizens.”).
28. Levy, supra note 27, at 1066.
29. See Michael Heise, Schoolhouses, Courthouses, and Statehouses: Educational
Finance, Constitutional Structure, and the Separation of Powers Doctrine, 33 LAND &
WATER L. REV. 281 (1998); William E. Thro, Judicial Analysis During the Third Wave of
School Finance Litigation: The Massachusetts Decision as a Model, 35 B.C. L. REV. 597,
598 n.4 (1994); Weishart, supra note 8, at 500–03; Gail F. Levine, Note, Meeting the
Third Wave: Legislative Approaches to Recent Judicial School Finance Rulings, 28 HARV.
J. ON LEGIS. 507, 507–08 (1991) (describing the “three waves” of school finance litigation);
see also Koski, supra note 8, at 1901–02 (calling the wave metaphor “ill-fitting at best” but
nonetheless “stick[ing] with that convention”).
30. See Weishart, supra note 8, at 500–01 (noting that during both the first and
second waves, the focus was “formal equality of educational opportunity”).
31. See Koski, supra note 8, at 1905 (“[A]dequacy is a measure that does not
compare the educational resources or outcomes of students with each other; rather, it looks
only to some minimally required level of resources for all students.”).
32. See Lundberg, supra note 6, at 1101; Karen Swenson, School Finance Reform
Litigation: Why are Some Supreme Courts Activist and Others Restrained?, 63 ALB. L.
REV. 1147, 1149 (2000).
33. See Rethinking, supra note 3, at 575; see also Lundberg, supra note 6, at 1103–04
(“Supreme courts in two states, Arizona and Ohio, originally declined to overturn their
school funding systems, but later overruled these decisions and found their systems
unconstitutional.”); Swenson, supra note 32, at 1149 n.12 (“The Arizona, Ohio, and
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More recently, litigants are shifting their focus away from inputs (like
money) to identifiable outcomes and the specific policies that affect those
outcomes.34 These include factors such as teacher tenure laws “that make it
difficult to discipline and remove underperforming teachers.”35 Some
plaintiffs have made demands for equal access to advanced placement
courses.36 Some have targeted the denial of specific factors, including
students’ instructional minutes, which directly affect children’s learning
opportunities.37 While these actions may lack the cohesiveness necessary
to dub them a “fourth wave,” there is a trend away from challenges based
simply on funding.

A.

The First and Second Waves and the Search for Equity

The first wave of school finance litigation involved challenges to
school funding schemes based on the federal Equal Protection Clause.38
These challenges were short-lived, beginning in 1971 and ending only two
years later.
In Serrano v. Priest, the California Supreme Court held that
education is a fundamental right.39 The court then held that the state’s
property-tax-based funding system violated that right by creating significant
spending disparities between school districts.40 The U.S. Supreme Court
quickly rejected this approach. In San Antonio Independent School
District v. Rodriguez,41 the Court held that education is not a fundamental
federal right, and that the states are free to balance the values of local

Washington high courts have also previously upheld their respective state’s financing
schemes . . . .”).
34. Koski, supra note 8, at 1915 (“[T]here appears to be an emerging educational
rights litigation movement that strategically departs from the [] focus on educational funding
and educational finance systems.”).
35. Id. at 1916.
36. Id. at 1917.
37. Id. at 1916 n.84.
38. See James E. Ryan, Schools, Race, and Money, 109 YALE L.J. 249, 266 (1999).
39. Serrano v. Priest, 487 P.2d 1241, 1244 (Cal. 1971) [hereinafter Serrano I] (“[T]he
right to an education in our public schools is a fundamental interest which cannot be
conditioned on wealth . . . .”).
40. See id. at 1264–66 (holding California’s property tax-based funding scheme
unconstitutional on state and federal equal protection grounds); see also Van Dusartz v.
Hatfield, 334 F. Supp. 870, 877 (D. Minn. 1971) (holding that Minnesota’s school finance
system violated the equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment because “spending per
pupil [was] a function of the school district’s wealth”); Milliken v. Green, 203 N.W.2d 457,
469–72 (Mich. 1972) (treating wealth as suspect classification).
41. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
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control and equality of educational resources.42 Thus, for forty-five years
courts have recognized that education is not a federal fundamental right,
that property wealth is therefore not a “suspect classification,” and that
inter-district inequalities in school spending do not violate the federal
Constitution.43
Following Rodriguez, plaintiffs shifted their focus. The “second wave”
litigants looked to state constitutional provisions, including both state equal
protection clauses and education clauses.44 Only one month after
Rodriguez, the New Jersey Supreme Court held that wide spending
disparities among school districts violated that state’s constitutional
requirement that the state maintain a “thorough and efficient” system of
public schools.45 Three years later, the California Supreme Court
reaffirmed Serrano on the grounds that funding disparities violated the
California Constitution’s equal protection clause.46 By the late 1970s, more
than twenty states faced challenges to their school finance systems, with
plaintiffs often seeking equalized per-pupil funding.47
The results of the second wave were mixed, but more favorable to
state defendants.48 Plaintiffs won seven of the twenty cases resolved by state
supreme courts.49 By 1980, roughly thirty states had been involved in some
form of school finance litigation.50 More than twenty states modified their
education finance systems, whether due to political pressures or as a result
42. See id. at 35–37, 111 (holding that education is not a fundamental right and
upholding an unequal school funding scheme under a rational basis review); see also
Richard Rothstein, Equalizing Education Resources on Behalf of Disadvantaged Children,
in A NOTION AT RISK: PRESERVING PUBLIC EDUCATION AS AN ENGINE FOR SOCIAL
MOBILITY 31, 66–67 (Richard D. Kahlenberg ed., 2000); Weishart, supra note 8, at 500–
01 (noting that the first wave was “derailed at the federal level when the Supreme Court
ruled . . . that education was not a fundamental right under the U.S. Constitution”).
43. See Rothstein supra note 42, at 67.
44. See Ryan, supra note 38, at 266; see also Weishart, supra note 8, at 501
(“Eschewing Rodriguez’s interpretations of the U.S. Constitution, plaintiffs resorted to the
education clauses and equal protection provisions of their state constitutions.”).
45. See Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273, 297–98 (N.J. 1973).
46. See Serrano v. Priest, 557 P.2d 929, 958 (Cal. 1976) [hereinafter Serrano II].
47. Rethinking, supra note 3, at 577.
48. See Paul A. Minorini & Stephen D. Sugarman, School Finance Litigation in the
Name of Educational Equity: Its Evolution, Impact, and Future, in EQUITY AND
ADEQUACY IN EDUCATION FINANCE: ISSUES AND PERSPECTIVES 34, 41–47 (Helen F.
Ladd et al. eds., 1999) (providing a state-by-state listing of school finance litigation cases
and their results).
49. See Carr & Fuhrman, supra note 1, at 146 (stating that plaintiffs won seven out of
sixteen school finance cases decided between 1973 and 1980); Weishart, supra note 8, at
501–02 (noting that plaintiffs prevailed in seven of twenty-two second wave decisions).
50. MARK G. YUDOF ET AL., EDUCATION POLICY AND THE LAW 592 (4th ed. 1992).
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of judicial decisions and orders.51 Plaintiffs “succeeded in obtaining greater
per-pupil spending equity across districts in those states that had their
school financing systems overturned,” but in some cases, the greater equity
came at the expense of “leveling down of education spending overall.”52
A number of the equity lawsuits brought in the 1970s, however, were
rejected. These included, among others, a challenge in my home state of
Ohio.53

B.

The Challenges of the Equity Approach

Plaintiffs were successful in only one of eight school finance cases
decided by state supreme courts between 1981 and 1988.54 This was a
significant drop-off from the prior eight years, in which plaintiffs
succeeded in seven cases.55 Whether for legal reasons or due to waning
popular support, most cases in the 1980s were characterized by deference
to state legislatures.56 Courts often dealt with state equal protection
challenges by holding that education is not a fundamental right and
therefore is not entitled to strict scrutiny under state constitutions.57
Unsurprisingly, courts generally found that school finance systems met the
more deferential rational basis test.58
While many second wave cases focused on equality, some plaintiffs
raised claims under education clauses requiring their states to provide and
maintain “adequate” or “thorough” systems of public schools.59 This trend
became increasingly common as plaintiffs recognized both the difficulty of
winning equity suits and the serious practical problems of the equity

51. See id.
52. Weishart, supra note 89, at 502.
53. See Bd. of Educ. v. Walter, 390 N.E.2d 813 (Ohio 1979) (rejecting challenges
based on state equal protection clause and education clause).
54. See Carr & Fuhrman, supra note 1, at 146; see also Minorini & Sugarman, supra
note 48, at 55 (stating that from 1980 to 1988, only two state courts invalidated their states’
school funding schemes, while eight upheld their systems as constitutional); Weishart,
supra note 8, at 505 (“[S]tate courts in the early and mid-1980s were inclined to uphold
school finance schemes and give deference to the legislative process.”).
55. Carr & Fuhrman, supra note 1, at 146.
56. Minorini & Sugarman, supra note 48, at 55.
57. Id. See generally Julie K. Underwood, School Finance Adequacy as Vertical
Equity, 28 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 493, 510 (1995) (discussing the levels of scrutiny
applicable to school finance challenges during the various waves of litigation).
58. Minorini & Sugarman, supra note 48, at 55; see also Rethinking, supra note 4, at
578.
59. See Kelly Thompson Cochran, Comment, Beyond School Financing, Defining
the Constitutional Right to an Adequate Education, 78 N.C. L. REV. 399, 411 (2000).
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approach. Among the most important of these was the recognition that
equalized funding is not a real solution if it is obtained by “leveling down”
resources in wealthier districts rather than “leveling up” resources for
poorer districts.60
This is, in fact, the pattern that began to develop. In states where the
equity approach was successful, it led to a more even distribution of
funding at the expense of overall per-pupil expenditures.61 Eleven states
enacted significant school funding reforms in the 1970s, but eight of those
states saw per-pupil expenditures fall relative to the national average.62
High profile missteps, such as the experience in California following
Serrano and the passage of Proposition 13, served as a warning to other
states.63 Many feared that the quest for “equity,” no matter how wellintentioned, could lead to funding decreases for a substantial number of
districts.64
Over time it became apparent that plaintiffs’ litigation strategy had to
reject the idea of leveling down funding from the highest spending districts.
“Leveling up,” however, is not as simple as it sounds. In the 1990s, for
example, Texas faced litigation in which the plaintiffs sought to fund all
districts at the 100th percentile.65 Yet such a remedy would have required a
school finance budget nearly four times as large as the entire annual state
budget—something neither the courts nor the legislature could provide.66 In
the long run, plaintiffs across the country realized that in order to succeed,

60. See YUDOF ET AL., supra note 50, at 811 (stating that “the fiscal neutrality
approach offered no solution if all districts were equally inadequately funded”).
61. Carr & Fuhrman, supra note 1, at 145–46; Weishart, supra note 8, at 502
(“[G]reater equity arguably came at a high cost—the leveling down of education spending
overall.”).
62. Carr & Fuhrman, supra note 1, at 146 (citing Patricia R. Brown & Richard F.
Elmore, Analyzing the Impact of School Finance Reform, in THE CHANGING POLITICS OF
SCHOOL FINANCE 107, 112 (Nelda H. Cambron-McCabe & Allan Odden eds., 1982)).
63. See Serrano II, 557 P.2d 929 (Cal. 1976). Following the California Supreme
Court’s decision in Serrano II, the state’s voters adopted Proposition 13, a constitutional
amendment limiting property tax rates to 1 percent of the cash value of real property
subject to taxation. See Minorini & Sugarman, supra note 48, at 49. Among other things,
Proposition 13 also required a two-thirds vote of the legislature to increase state taxes. Id.
Over time, California went from being one of the highest spending states per pupil for
elementary and secondary education to one of the lowest. Id.
64. See Rethinking, supra note 3, at 579 (“[D]ue to the well-known problems in
California . . . many saw the banner of ‘equity’ as ‘equally bad for all.’”).
65. See Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. 1989).
66. Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 804 S.W.2d 491, 495–96 (Tex. 1991); J.
Steven Farr & Mark Trachtenberg, The Edgewood Drama: An Epic Quest for Education
Equity, 17 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 607, 649 (1999).
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they had to be realistic about their goals and seek remedies for which state
governments could actually follow through.
Policymakers also increasingly distinguished school funding from
providing a quality education. School funding is part of the overall
equation, but it is not a cure-all for every educational deficiency.
Governors and state legislators were turning their attention toward
improving education in other ways. These included strengthening
standards, graduation requirements, and teacher certification requirements
and compensation.67
The rhetoric of “adequacy” also showed promise for plaintiffs who
were unsatisfied with the courtroom results of the equity approach. There
was reason for optimism. Although the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in
Rodriguez closed the door for equal protection violations under the U.S.
Constitution, the Court recognized the difference between an “unequal
system” and one that “occasioned an absolute denial of educational
opportunities to” some children.68 The Court noted that a system that
precluded poor children from receiving an education “would present a far
more compelling set of circumstances for judicial assistance.”69
This change in focus became necessary for plaintiffs. By the 1990s,
several courts found that equity plaintiffs had not demonstrated an actual
denial of constitutional rights.70 Courts were increasingly unlikely to strike
down a school finance system based on solely on inter-district disparities.71
Thus, plaintiffs began to question whether school funding systems were
“adequate,” i.e., whether they were meeting some basic standards
necessary to provide all districts’ students with a constitutionally-required
minimum level of education.72 This ushered in the third wave of school
finance lawsuits.

C.

The Third Wave and the Search for an Adequate Education

Commentators generally agree that the third wave began in 1989, with
plaintiff victories in Kentucky73 and Montana.74 The new adequacy-based
67. Carr & Fuhrman, supra note 1, at 147.
68. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 37 (1973).
69. Id. at 25 n.60.
70. See Hornbeck v. Somerset Cty. Bd. of Educ., 458 A.2d 758 (Md. 1983); Bd. of
Educ. v. Nyquist, 439 N.E.2d 359 (N.Y. 1982); Britt v. N.C. State Bd. of Educ., 357 S.E.2d
432 (N.C. Ct. App. 1987); Kukor v. Grover, 436 N.W.2d 568 (Wis. 1989).
71. Minorini & Sugarman, supra note 48, at 55.
72. Id. at 55–56 (footnote omitted).
73. Rose v. Council for Better Educ., 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989); see Weishart,
supra note 8, at 502 (“The third wave of school finance litigation (1989-present) was
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litigation focused on the sufficiency of school funding.75 In these cases,
plaintiffs relied on state education clauses to argue that all children are
entitled to some base level of educational quality.76 Third wave plaintiffs
have typically sought to bring the lowest-funded school districts up to the
minimum level mandated by state constitutions.77
Plaintiffs’ shift in strategy paid off. The third wave plaintiffs have had
much better overall success than their predecessors. More than thirty
school finance lawsuits have been brought since 1989, with plaintiffs
succeeding (at least in part) in more than twenty of those.78 So while these
results have been mixed, the third wave was much better for plaintiffs, as a
number of courts throughout the country were persuaded that their state’s
poorest school districts failed to meet some minimum standard.79
Additionally, courts in a few states that had previously rejected equity
challenges to their school finance systems, like my home state of Ohio,
found their states’ systems unconstitutional under an adequacy-based
standard.80
Adequacy has been more compelling than equity in the courtroom,
leading commentators to describe it—correctly, in my view—as the
“dominant legal theory” in school finance litigation.81 Why is this so? I
have argued before that the adequacy approach seeks a goal that is both
triggered by the Supreme Court of Kentucky’s decision that the state’s ‘entire system of
common schools [was] unconstitutional.’”) (alteration and emphasis in original) (quoting
Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 215).
74. Helena Elementary Sch. Dist. v. State, 769 P.2d 684 (Mont. 1989).
75. Heise, supra note 29, at 1019.
76. As discussed above, nearly every state has some constitutional provision regarding
public education. See supra note 6 and accompanying text; see also Swenson, supra note
32, at 1148 n.9 (listing state constitutional provisions); Thro, supra note 11, at 538–39 n.33
(same).
77. See Rethinking, supra note 3, at 582; Ryan, supra note 38, at 268; Thro, supra
note 29, at 603.
78. See Davis, supra note 6, at 123 (“[T]wenty-two out of thirty-three, or sixty-seven
percent, of adequacy cases decided since 1989 have been victories for the plaintiffs.”)
(citing Michael A. Rebell, COURTS AND KIDS: PURSUING EDUCATIONAL EQUITY
THROUGH THE STATE COURTS 15–29 (2009)); Julia A. Simon-Kerr & Robynn K. Sturm,

Justiciability and the Role of Courts in Adequacy Litigation: Preserving the Constitutional
Right to Education, 6 STAN. J.C.R. & C.L. 83, 85 (2010) (noting that between 1989 and
2005, adequacy plaintiffs “won more than seventy-five percent of the cases”) (footnote
omitted).
79. Swenson, supra note 32.
80. See Lundberg, supra note 6, at 1103–04 (noting that Ohio and Arizona rejected
challenges to their school funding schemes, but later found them unconstitutional under an
adequacy standard).
81. Weishart, supra note 8, at 482.

2019]

SCHOOL LITIGATION AND SEPARATION OF POWERS

549

more modest and more important than equalized funding.82 Adequacy
“refers to resources which are sufficient (or adequate) to achieve some
educational result,” or some other measurement of educational
attainment.83 It is an outcome-oriented strategy focused on the quality of
education provided to a state’s students.84 The adequacy approach does
not quibble over the relative distribution of resources. Rather, it asks what
inputs are needed to attain a desired level of achievement and seeks that
level of funding.85 Although both adequacy and equity lawsuits are about
money, the adequacy approach seems more student-centered.
As a personal matter, I believe that the adequacy approach also is
more in line with the goals of students’ parents, and with the views of many
policymakers. As a parent, I am much more concerned with the absolute
quality of education my children receive than I am with whether students
at another school received a higher per-pupil funding amount. Adequacy
changes the focus from inputs to outputs, is “less complicated,” and is (at
least in theory) “less costly” than equalization.86
The adequacy standard also is more respectful of the separation of
powers. It is the function of courts “to say what the law is.”87 This arguably
includes determining if a minimum standard is required by the state
constitution, finding that a specific set of facts does not meet that standard,
and then holding the underlying system unconstitutional. Indeed, the
latter is the very essence of judicial review. By contrast, the equity
approach practically invites courts to engage in policymaking by ordering
funding levels, even though state constitutions leave such functions to the
legislature. By doing so, the equity approach runs afoul of our traditional
view of the separation of powers. In our system of government, “the power

82.
83.

See Rethinking, supra note 3, at 582.
YUDOF ET AL., supra note 50, at 773 (citing William Clune, Accelerated
Education as a Remedy for High-Poverty Schools, 28 U. MICH. L. REV. 655 (1995)).
84. Rethinking, supra note 3, at 583.
85. See Introduction, in EQUITY AND ADEQUACY IN EDUCATION FINANCE: ISSUES
AND PERSPECTIVES

1, 1–2 (Helen F. Ladd et al. eds., 1999).
86. Ryan, supra note 38, at 270 (arguing that the adequacy approach “is less
complicated a notion, more normatively appealing…. [and] is also less costly” than the
equity approach).
87. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (“It is emphatically
the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.”); THE FEDERALIST
NO. 78, at 466 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (stating that it is the duty
of courts “to declare all acts contrary to the manifest tenor of the Constitution void”); see
also THE FEDERALIST NO. 80, at 475 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)
(arguing that, in the federal context, courts should give efficacy to constitutional provisions).
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of judging” is “separated from the legislative and executive powers.”88 It is
the fundamental province of the courts to say what the law is, but not what
it should be.89
Of course, not all courts deciding “adequacy” cases have confined
their decisions to the constitutional questions properly before them. Some
courts—including the Kentucky Supreme Court in its decision kicking off
the third wave—have taken an activist approach and substituted their will
for that of the legislature.90

D. Recent Trends in Education Litigation
If the third wave is still going on, it has been slowing down for quite
some time. Commentators have noted, “the balance between deference
and action by courts in adequacy suits has begun to tip toward deference
and away from judicial intervention.”91 Plaintiffs’ adequacy claims were
dismissed prior to trial in nine of nineteen decisions between 2005 and
2008.92 This compares to only five such decisions over the preceding
sixteen years.93
So why the shift in outcomes? I believe this is due to a host of factors,
not the least of which is a feeling that school funding issues have been
“dealt with” by prior courts and prior legislatures. Whether accurate or
not, this view has some factual support. Adequacy lawsuits generally did
have a positive effect on school funding, with litigation or legislative
education reform leading to significant increases in overall education
spending.94 In states where litigation was successful, court-mandated

88. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 87, at 466 (quoting 1 BARON DE
MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF LAWS 181).
89. See id. at 469 (“If [courts] should be disposed to exercise WILL instead of
JUDGMENT, the consequence would equally be the substitution of their pleasure to that
of the legislative body.” (emphasis in original)).
90. See Rose v. Council for Better Educ., 790 S.W.2d 186, 212 (Ky. 1989) (setting
out substantive policy goals).
91. Simon-Kerr & Sturm, supra note 78, at 85.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. William N. Evans et al., The Impact of Court-Mandated School Finance Reform,
in EQUITY AND ADEQUACY IN EDUCATION FINANCE: ISSUES AND PERSPECTIVES 72, 75
(Helen F. Ladd et al. eds., 1999) (citing R.L. Manwaring & S.M. Sheffrin, Litigation,
School Finance Reform, and Aggregate Educational Spending, 4 INT’L TAX & PUB. FIN.
107 (1995)).
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education finance reforms greatly reduced inter-district inequalities as
well.95
The adequacy movement gained steam largely because it is relatively
modest compared to the demands of the equity movement.96 This,
however, means that there is also an outside limit to how far courts are
willing to go, or how often they are willing to act. If a state is already
providing the constitutionally-required education, the case for judicial
intervention becomes less compelling. That a desired reform might make
a state’s school system “better” (from the plaintiffs’ perspective) does not
necessarily justify judicial intervention. State education clauses set a
minimum threshold that must be met.97 Those thresholds should be
enforced by the courts. They do not, however, create a free-flowing license
for judicial intervention any time there is a policy disagreement.
Of course, there remains significant debate over just how much
money matters to educational outcomes. Michael Rebell98 has argued that
in the cases where plaintiffs have prevailed, “the courts determined
explicitly or implicitly that ‘money matters.’”99 In contrast, however, in
most of the cases in which defendants have prevailed, “the courts did not
discuss expenditure/education outcome correlations at all.”100 Those courts

95. See id. at 77 (indicating that reforms stemming from court decisions have resulted
in increased spending in poor and median districts while leaving spending in higher wealth
districts relatively constant); see also Paul A. Minorini & Stephen D. Sugarman,

Educational Adequacy and the Courts: The Promise and Problems of Moving to a New
Paradigm, in EQUITY AND ADEQUACY IN EDUCATION FINANCE: ISSUES AND PERSPECTIVES
175, 186 (Helen F. Ladd et al. eds., 1999) (“Research has shown that in other states where
courts have ordered school finance reform, school spending has gone up. Essentially, the
judiciary has forced a leveling up of lower-spending districts.”) (citing W.S. Evans et. al,
Schoolhouses, Courthouses, and Statehouses after Serrano, 16 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS &
MGMT. 10, 10–31 (1997)).
96. See generally Quentin A. Palfrey, The State Judiciary’s Role in Fulfilling Brown’s
Promise, 8 MICH. J. RACE & L. 1, 16–24 (2002).
97. See Molly McUsic, The Use of Education Clauses in School Finance Reform
Litigation, 28 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 307 (1991); Molly A. Hunter, State Constitution
Education Clause Language, EDUCATION JUSTICE, http://www.edlawcenter.org/assets/files/
pdfs/State%20Constitution%20Education%20Clause%20Language.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y
6MF-45JJ].
98. Michael A. Rebell is professor of practice in law and educational policy at
Teachers College, Columbia University, and an adjunct professor at Columbia Law
School. Michael A. Rebell, The Courts’ Consensus: Money Does Matter for Educational
Opportunity, 674 ANNALS 184, 184 (Oct. 25, 2017).
99. Id. at 191.
100. Id.
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have tended to focus on other questions, like the separation of powers and
comity between the branches of state government.101
In any event, it seems clear that the right to an adequate or equal
education “need not be defined solely in monetary terms.”102 Indeed, I
have argued before that it should not be.103 School finance lawsuits often
seek to compensate for the shortcomings of other impact litigation, like
desegregation lawsuits. The corollary also is true, that other types of
lawsuits may seek to overcome the perceived inadequacy of school finance
reform.104 We have seen an uptick in such cases as plaintiffs have shifted
their focus from educational inputs, like money, to educational outputs
and student performance.
Just as the move from the second wave to the third wave was
prompted (at least in part) by strategic necessity, “there appears to be an
emerging educational rights litigation movement that strategically departs
from the third-wave focus on educational funding and educational finance
systems.”105 These new cases focus “on outcomes rather than such inputs
as race and resources.”106 These cases “thrust[] education litigants deeper
into the education enterprise” because student achievement is the desired
outcome.107 Rather than focusing on broad, statewide funding schemes, the
emphasis is instead on narrow, identifiable policies that allegedly result in
harms to specific groups of students.108
Thus, where the emphasis historically has been on money, a visible
shift has emerged toward challenging policies such as teacher tenure
laws,109 instructional minutes,110 and uneven access to advanced placement

101. Id. (“In these cases, the courts upheld the defendants’ position by applying
separation-of-powers principles and holding that school-funding issues should be
determined by the legislative and executive branches rather than by the courts . . . .”).
102. James E. Ryan, Sheff, Segregation, and School Finance Litigation, 74 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 529, 532 (1999).
103. Rethinking, supra note 3, at 580 (citing Ryan, supra note 102, at 532).
104. See, e.g., Sheff v. O’Neill, 678 A.2d 1267 (Conn. 1996).
105. Koski, supra note 8, at 1915.
106. Michael Heise, Litigated Learning and the Limits of Law, 57 VAND. L. REV.
2417, 2421 (2004).
107. Id.
108. See Koski, supra note 8, at 1915–16.
109. See id. at 1920–21 (discussing challenges in California, New York, Minnesota,
and New Jersey to teacher tenure rules and “last in, first out” reduction-in-force rules on
the grounds that they deny economically disadvantaged children equal protection).
110. See id. at 1916 & n.84 (discussing a California class action challenging an alleged
lack of instructional minutes).
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courses.111 Even in the context of a traditional school finance challenge,
some have argued that a state’s system is “qualitatively inefficient” because
it places a statutory cap on charter schools and imposes excessive
regulations on traditional public schools.112
These lawsuits present a new series of questions about the judiciary’s
role in education policy. Is it really a court’s job to decide whether
students should receive greater access to advanced placement courses?
Are these types of questions qualitatively different from deciding whether
or not a funding system provides a constitutionally-required minimum
level of educational opportunities? Arguably, weighing in on discreet
policies is less “activist” than ruling a state’s school funding scheme
unconstitutional. Nonetheless, making education policy may be beyond
the scope of the judiciary’s proper role.
III. HOW HAVE COURTS BALANCED THE SEPARATION OF POWERS IN
SCHOOL FINANCE LITIGATION?
When I looked at these issues in 2004, I concluded that many school
finance cases “have failed to balance the principles of judicial review and
separation of powers.”113 I found the case law often followed one of two
approaches, which William Thro114 referred to as “judicial activism and
judicial abdication.”115
This language may sound harsh. When I borrowed these terms from
Thro, however, I hoped to capture two different concepts. By judicial
activism, I meant that some courts had gone beyond the constitutional
language in front of them—in some cases well beyond that language—and
substituted their own policy preferences for those of the legislature. By
judicial abdication, I meant that some courts failed to provide adequate
judicial review and therefore failed to enforce constitutional mandates that
were found within their states’ relevant provisions.116
111. See id. at 1916–17 & n.85 (discussing a California class action seeking equal
access to advanced placement courses).
112. See id. at 1921 & n.109 (discussing Texas litigation challenging a statutory cap on
charter schools, alleging “over-regulation of traditional public schools,” and challenging the
ability of districts to reject transfer students from underperforming schools).
113. Rethinking, supra note 3, at 585.
114. William Thro is the General Counsel of the University of Kentucky and
previously served as Solicitor General of Virginia. William Thro, UK LAW,
https://www.uky.edu/legal/william-thro [https://perma.cc/SB88-9TEC].
115. Rethinking, supra note 3, at 585–86 (citing Thro, supra note 10, at 530, 532).
116. Thro’s definitions of these terms appear congruous with my usage. According to
Thro, judicial abdication has taken two forms. “First, some courts have held that questions
of educational quality are non-justiciable. This is incorrect. While courts are not competent
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There was no shortage of cases fitting either of these patterns. Courts
in numerous states applied a quality standard, or in some cases found a
fundamental right to education, even though their constitutional provisions
contained no such standard.117 Other courts declined to make such
findings, even though their constitutional provisions did contain such
standards or otherwise suggested that education is a fundamental right.118
At the time, I suggested a third approach, which I believed would better
balance the principles of judicial review and the separation of powers.119
The distinctions between “judicial activism” and “judicial restraint,”
and even “judicial abdication,” are not theoretical. Examples of each are
found throughout case law—significant cases that have real-world impacts
on students and on states’ fiscal and tax policies (which in turn impact the
states’ abilities to provide for other social services). Thus, when I wrote
about this subject before, I provided examples of cases that exemplified
activism, on one hand, and an overly aggressive version of judicial
restraint, on the other.120 Those cases stood as a stark reminder that many
courts are outcome-oriented, and that some will reach a desired outcome
regardless of the fact patterns and constitutional questions in front of them.
For example, in 1997, the Vermont Supreme Court addressed an
equity challenge to the state’s school funding system in Brigham v. State.121
The court struck down the state’s school funding scheme and created its
own substantive benchmarks for education policy.122 It did this despite
interpreting one of the weaker education clauses in the nation.
Many state constitutions contain mandates that their systems be
“thorough and efficient” or “uniform.”123 Vermont’s education clause, by
to create their own educational standards, they are perfectly capable of applying a standard
created by another branch.” Thro, supra note 11, at 546–47. “Second, some courts, while
articulating a standard, have adopted a standard that is relatively easy to meet.” Id. at 547.
“On the judicial activist side,” Thro is critical of decisions “where the court created its own
standard and set that standard extremely high.” Id.
117. These decisions included cases in Alabama, Arizona, Connecticut,
Massachusetts, Nebraska, New York, North Carolina, Tennessee, and Vermont. See id. at
540–41.
118. Id. at 542 (discussing cases in Georgia and Illinois).
119. See Rethinking, supra note 4, at 586.
120. See id.
121. 692 A.2d 384 (Vt. 1997).
122. Id. at 386, 397.
123. For example, at least eight state constitutions mandate a “thorough and efficient”
system of free public schools. These include Maryland, Minnesota, New Jersey, Ohio,
Pennsylvania, South Dakota, West Virginia, and Wyoming. Seven additional states require
either “thorough” or “efficient.” These include Arkansas, Colorado, Delaware, Idaho,
Illinois, Kentucky, and Texas. YUDOF ET AL., supra note 50, at 810; see also supra notes
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contrast, states only “a competent number of schools ought to be
maintained in each town unless the general assembly permits other
provisions for the convenient instruction of youth.”124 Arguably, the words
“ought to be maintained” are aspirational and do not contain a mandate at
all. This clause also is notable for its legislative “escape hatch.” Even if the
clause could be construed as a mandate, it does not apply at all if the
Vermont general assembly “permits other provisions” in its place.125
The facts in Brigham also were less than compelling. Plaintiffs from
lower-wealth districts asserted that the state’s school funding system denied
them equal opportunities compared to students from wealthier districts.126
They did not allege that the system was fundamentally inadequate or failed
to impart basic skills,127 and the distinction between the wealthiest and
poorest districts was far less stark than many other states.128 The case had
come before the Vermont Supreme Court on appeal of a summary
judgment order, so plaintiffs had not developed a factual record
establishing that the state’s funding scheme was inadequate.129
With this legal and factual backdrop, the Brigham court not only
ruled for the plaintiffs, but found that no legitimate government purpose
could justify the state’s inter-district spending differences.130 The court also
used the lawsuit as a vehicle for setting substantive benchmarks for

21, 23–26 and accompanying text (discussing examples of state education clauses with such
mandates).
124. VT. CONST. ch. II, § 68.
125. Id.
126. 692 A.2d at 386; see also Michael A. Rebell & Jeffrey Metzler, Rapid Response,
Radical Reform: The Story of School Finance Litigation in Vermont, 31 J.L. & EDUC. 167,
171–72 (2002) (stating that the plaintiffs’ primary claim was that Vermont’s education
finance system deprived students of their right to equal educational opportunities).
127. Brigham, 692 A.2d at 387.
128. In some states, the ratio of education spending between “property-rich” and
“property-poor” districts reached as high as nine-to-one. See, e.g., Farr & Trachtenberg,
supra note 66, at 615 (discussing the disparities between districts in Texas). Vermont, by
contrast, had a ratio of roughly two-to-one at the time of the Brigham decision. See Rebell
& Metzler, supra note 126, at 169. To be clear, as a legislator I would support policies
designed to improve parity in either case. However, compared to other states, Vermont’s
situation does not seem to warrant such robust judicial interventionism.
129. See Rebell & Metzler, supra note 126, at 176 (“Brigham v. State never went to
trial.”); see also id. at 177 (“Issued only four months after initial filing, [Brigham]
invalidated the entire state education funding system on the basis of a motion for summary
judgment.”).
130. See 692 A.2d at 396 (stating that “we are simply unable to fathom a legitimate
governmental purpose to justify” the state’s inter-district inequalities in school funding).
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education policy, including preparing students to participate in democratic
self-government and to compete in a “global marketplace.”131
As a policymaker, I see some value in those benchmarks. Whatever
their merits, though, they are not found within Vermont’s education
clause. There is little in the Vermont Constitution to suggest that the state’s
highest court should issue such a sweeping decision. The relevant
question, for separation of powers concerns, is whether the court actually
has the responsibility and authority for this type of ruling. It is not enough
that the court is instituting a policy that we might agree with.132
Right around the same time, in 1996, the Illinois Supreme Court
issued a ruling that is arguably at the other end of the activism/restraint
spectrum. In Committee for Educational Rights v. Edgar, the court
rejected a challenge to Illinois’ school funding system and found that such
issues lie “solely” within the purview of the legislature.133 The court did this
despite interpreting a much stronger constitutional mandate, and assessing
a more compelling fact pattern than what the Vermont court faced the
following year in Brigham.
The Illinois Constitution lists the “educational development of all
persons” as a “fundamental goal” of the state.134 It requires “an efficient
system of high quality public educational institutions and services.”135
Illinois’ education clause also imposes “primary responsibility for
financing the system of public education” directly upon “the State.”136
Hoping to enforce these seemingly strong requirements, the Edgar
plaintiffs alleged that the state’s funding scheme was unduly reliant on local
property taxes, and that this led to wide disparities in resources between
school districts.137 In the 1989–90 school year, for example, the average tax
base in the wealthiest ten percent of elementary schools was over thirteen

131. Id. at 396–97.
132. As with many of these cases, the results of Brigham were mixed. The Vermont
legislature responded to the court’s decision with reforms that replaced most local property
taxes with a statewide property tax. The state also initiated a “sharing pool,” where districts
that chose to impose a local tax (to provide additional support beyond the state minimum)
were required to give a portion of their revenues to property-poor districts. See Rebell &
Metzler, supra note 126, at 167, 179–82. Most of Vermont’s school districts received
additional funding under the new scheme. Taxes more than doubled in the wealthiest
districts, however, and per-pupil spending in those districts actually decreased. Id. at 182.
133. 672 N.E.2d 1178, 1189 (Ill. 1996).
134. ILL. CONST. art. X, § 1.
135. Id. (emphasis added).
136. Id.
137. 672 N.E.2d at 1182.
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times the average tax base in the poorest ten percent.138 The ratio of the
average tax bases in the wealthiest and poorest high school districts was
more than eight-to-one.139
In assessing the plaintiffs’ claims, the Illinois Supreme Court
acknowledged that courts in other jurisdictions had found violations of less
stringent state constitutional standards, such as “thorough” or “efficient.”140
Nonetheless, the Edgar court held that the question of whether Illinois
educational institutions were “high quality” is “outside the sphere” of the
judicial function.141 The court emphasized the limits of its role, stating that
education is not “a subject within the judiciary’s field of expertise” and that
it would be “conceit” for the court to develop education quality
standards.142

A.

Does Constitutional Language Determine Litigation Outcomes?

To a reasonable observer, the courts’ decisions in Brigham and
Edgar might raise the question of whether constitutional language actually
determines litigation outcomes. On their face, the examples of Vermont
and Illinois may appear to be outliers. One involved a court issuing an
“equity” ruling, despite interpreting a weak constitutional provision and
having few facts to support its holding.143 The other involved a court
holding plaintiffs’ challenge non-justiciable despite a strong constitutional
mandate and an equally strong fact pattern.144 While these may be more
stark than other cases, Brigham and Edgar are symptomatic of a larger
divergence between constitutional language and litigation outcomes.
As others have noted, “the willingness of a court to hold an
educational system unconstitutional has not always been consistent with
[the perceived strength] of that state’s education clause.”145 To the contrary,
observers have found that “constitutional language seems to have had little

138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 1191–92.
141. Id. at 1193.
142. Id. at 1191.
143. Brigham v. State, 692 A.2d 384, 397 (Vt. 1997) (holding “that to fulfill its
constitutional obligation the state must ensure substantial equality of educational
opportunity throughout Vermont” (emphasis added)).
144. Edgar, 672 N.E.2d at 1193 (holding “that the question of whether educational
institutions and services in Illinois are ‘high quality’ is outside the sphere of the judicial
function”).
145. Brooker, supra note 6, at 201.
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effect on certain case outcomes.”146 Thus, a number of state courts have
imposed a “quality” standard “despite the fact that their state constitutions
do not contain one.”147
This divergence between constitutional language and litigation
outcomes can be seen in some of the most pivotal cases in the nationwide
school finance movement. In the case that kicked off the “third wave,”
Rose v. Council for Better Education,148 the Kentucky Supreme Court
went well beyond the state’s constitutional language. Kentucky’s education
clause requires only that the General Assembly “provide for an efficient
system of common schools throughout the State.”149 This is fairly weak
when compared to other states’ education clauses. Yet, the Kentucky
Supreme Court relied on this provision in setting its own qualitative
standards for the state’s education system.150
The Kentucky Supreme Court’s judicially-prescribed standards bear
little relation to the constitutional language and only indirectly relate to
questions of school finance. According to the Rose court, an educated
child must demonstrate “at least the seven following capabilities:”
(i) sufficient oral and written communication skills to enable
students to function in a complex and rapidly changing
civilization; (ii) sufficient knowledge of economic, social, and
political systems to enable the student to make informed
choices; (iii) sufficient understanding of governmental processes
to enable the student to understand the issues that affect his or
her community, state, and nation; (iv) sufficient self-knowledge
and knowledge of his or her mental and physical wellness; (v)
sufficient grounding in the arts to enable each student to
appreciate his or her cultural and historical heritage; (vi)
sufficient training or preparation for advanced training in either
academic or vocational fields so as to enable each child to
choose and pursue life work intelligently; and (vii) sufficient
level of academic or vocational skills to enable public school

146. William S. Koski, The Politics of Judicial Decision-Making in Educational Policy
Reform Litigation, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 1077, 1087 (2004) [hereinafter Politics of Judicial
Decision-Making]; see also id. at n.30 (“To date, courts often have ignored the meaning of
the text [of their own constitutions] and/or the decisions from other states.” (quoting Thro,
supra note 10, at 540)).
147. Bess J. DuRant, The Political Question Doctrine: A Doctrine for Long-Term
Change in Our Public Schools, 59 S.C. L. REV. 531, 535–36 (2008); see also id. at 536 n.38
(collecting cases).
148. 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989).
149. KY. CONST. § 183.
150. Compare supra notes 22–26 and accompanying text.
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students to compete favorably with their counterparts in
surrounding states, in academics or in the job market.151
Let me be clear: I support these goals, and I agree that some variation
of them ought to be considered by policymakers like legislators or boards
of education. We want our children to make informed decisions,
understand our government, be mentally and physically well, and compete
well in the job market. I doubt many people would disagree with those
aspirations. These are not, however, required by the text of the Kentucky
Constitution’s education clause. Nor do they provide enforceable
standards related to school finance. These are vague aspirations—policy
goals—superimposed by the state supreme court onto the state
constitution. They are judicial policymaking.
The activist nature of this decision was amplified by later courts’
reliance on its holding. For example, the Kentucky Supreme Court’s
judicially-created standards were adopted wholesale by the Massachusetts
Supreme Court a few years later.152 It was a different court, facing a
different set of facts, interpreting a different constitutional provision.153 Yet
the outcome from one state was adopted by the other. As both an attorney
and a legislator, I am skeptical that the meaning of the Massachusetts
education clause happens to so closely correspond with the
contemporaneous decision of a different state court interpreting a different
constitutional provision.
It bears repeating that the divergence between constitutional language
and outcomes is not limited to courts that are “activist.” Another example
of a court arguably failing to provide adequate judicial review can be found
in Pawtucket v. Sundlun, in which the Rhode Island Supreme Court
considered a challenge to that state’s school funding scheme.154 The text of
Rhode Island’s constitutional mandate is among the strongest in the
nation. It indicates that knowledge and virtue are “essential for the
preservation of [the people’s] rights and liberties” and declares it the
legislature’s “duty” to promote public schools to “secure to the people the
advantages and opportunities of education.”155 Notwithstanding this

151. 790 S.W.2d at 212.
152. See McDuffy v. Sec’y of Exec. Office of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516, 554 (Mass.
1993) (citing Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 212).
153. The Massachusetts Constitution requires that the legislature “cherish the interests
of literature and the sciences . . . [and] encourage private societies and public institutions,
rewards and immunities . . . .” MASS. CONST. pt. 2, ch. 5, § 2.
154. 662 A.2d 40 (R.I. 1995).
155. R.I. CONST. art. XII, §1.
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language, the Sundlun court rejected the plaintiffs’ challenge on the basis
that the legislature has “virtually unreviewable discretion in this area.”156
The Rhode Island Supreme Court’s decision sticks out because it
seems to lay the groundwork for judicial intervention, before holding that
such intervention is beyond the court’s authority. The court specifically
recognized that it is “the province and duty of the judicial department to
say what the law is.”157 Likewise, the court acknowledged that “the right to
an education is a constitutional right” in Rhode Island.158 Nonetheless, the
court held that the state legislature, and the legislature alone, is responsible
for enforcing that right. “[P]laintiffs have asked the judicial branch to
enforce policies for which there are no judicially manageable standards.”159
Thus, “the proper forum for this deliberation is the General Assembly,
not the courtroom.”160
I am not suggesting that all court decisions reflect the disconnect that
we see in Brigham, Edgar, Rose, or Sundlun. Some courts are
undoubtedly called on to interpret middle-of-the-road constitutional
provisions and are faced with fact patterns that tend to support the courts’
holdings. It concerns me, however, that so many courts appear to be
outcome-driven.

B. What About the Separation of Powers?
To the extent that people are looking at the interplay between
constitutional language and litigation outcomes, the literature tends to
focus on states’ education clauses.161 These clauses generally form the basis
(or at least one of the bases) for modern school finance lawsuits.162 It is
worth considering, however, that many states also have constitutional
language that deals directly with the separation of powers.163 Yet the
156. 662 A.2d at 57.
157. Id. at 59 (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)).
158. Id. at 57.
159. Id. at 58.
160. Id.
161. Brooker, supra note 6, at 183 (“Over time, the focus in school finance litigation
has shifted from equality, which focuses on broad equal protection clause principles, to
adequacy and minimum quality standards, which focuses primarily on narrow, state
constitution specific education clauses.”).
162. See Aaron Y. Tang, Broken Systems, Broken Duties: A New Theory for School
Finance Litigation, 94 MARQ. L. REV. 1195, 1206–11 (2011) (discussing the “adequacy
theory” for lawsuits targeting the education clauses present in state constitutions).
163. G. Alan Tarr, Interpreting the Separation of Powers in State Constitutions, 59
N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 329, 337 (2003) (“As of 1998, forty state constitutions
contained express separation-of-powers requirements.”).
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strength of these provisions also is not an accurate predictor of litigation
outcomes.
Professor Scott Bauries164 has attempted to measure the correlation
between “the explicitness of a state’s constitutional text relating to
separation of powers and the decision of the state’s courts whether to
engage in merits adjudication of educational adequacy claims.”165 Despite
the “near-ubiquitous consideration of separation of powers principles in
the cases,” Professor Bauries found “no evidence of any association
between these two variables.”166 To the contrary, he found that whether the
separation of powers provisions of a particular state’s constitution are
explicit or implicit “is of no help whatsoever in predicting the extent to
which the state’s highest court will engage in or approve merits review or
remediation of an alleged constitutional violation.”167
For those concerned about the separation of powers, or about
limiting the role of the judiciary in policymaking, these patterns are
disconcerting. First, as discussed above, even in pivotal cases there is an
apparent disconnect between the strength of education clauses and
litigation outcomes.168 Second, according to Professor Bauries, there is also
no correlation between the provisions relating directly to the separation of
powers and state courts’ decisions to reach the merits in such cases.169 Both
of these are counterintuitive. One should reasonably expect that the
language of these constitutional provisions would be among the factors
most highly correlated with litigation outcomes.
So how and why do courts reach the results that they do? Academic
analysis suggests a variety of factors in addition to the constitutional
language and the facts before the court. These include, unsurprisingly,
judges’ political partisanship and their personal and professional
backgrounds.170 Observers have also pointed to a host of other factors that
164. Scott Bauries is a Professor of Law at the University of Kentucky. Scott R.
Bauries, UK LAW, http://law.uky.edu/directory/scott-r-bauries [https://perma.cc/5H2JW626].
165. Bauries, supra note 9, at 701.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 744–45.
168. Id. at 712–13 (“[L]ittle scholarship has been able to identify a relationship
between the language of a state constitution’s education clause and the outcome of
education finance litigation in that state.”).
169. Id. at 744–45 (evaluating the results of an analysis showing there is no correlation
between the explicitness of the state constitution’s separation of powers provision and the
court’s decision to reach the merits).
170. Chia & Seo, supra note 18, at 138 (“Studies have connected judges’ political
partisanship to the varying outcomes in adequacy cases in different states . . . .”). See
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may affect judicial behavior, including “a judge’s underlying judicial
philosophy, the selection process and tenure of state judges, and a judge’s
perception of institutional constraints.”171
Professor William Koski172 has compared Ohio’s late 1990s school
finance litigation with contemporaneous litigation in Wisconsin and
considered “the political environment” surrounding the courts’
decisions.173 At first glance (and assuming relatively similar fact patterns),
one might predict that these cases would have similar outcomes. In each
state, courts had previously rejected a challenge to that state’s school
funding scheme.174 The states had similar populations, which Professor
Koski describes as “modestly diverse,” with similar geographic
distributions.175 Each state had a diversified economy, and each had a
Republican governor opposed to judicial intervention.176 As Koski points
out, however, “the results in the two states’ cases were quite different, as
the Ohio Supreme Court struck down its state’s school finance scheme,
while the Wisconsin Supreme Court upheld its scheme.”177
What explains this difference? Koski concludes (with some
justification, in my view) that differences in judicial attitudes and political
environments resulted in different outcomes. His conclusion is almost selfexplanatory: “a more liberal and activist judiciary is more likely to find
unconstitutional the state’s educational finance policy.”178 As an attorney, I
would like to believe that differing outcomes were due to factual
distinctions between the cases, or some nuanced distinctions between the
constitutional language that each court was addressing.179 Litigants should
certainly hope and expect that this is how cases are decided. Nonetheless,
Koski’s analysis seems to confirm what most of us intuitively know (or at
generally Politics of Judicial Decision-Making, supra note 147, at 1088–04 (discussing
factors, including politics, that effect judges’ decision-making in school finance cases).
171. Chia & Seo, supra note 18, at 138.
172. William Koski is an Associate Professor of Law at Stanford Law School. Politics
of Judicial Decision-Making, supra note 146, at 1077 n.a1.
173. See id. at 1083.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. The Ohio and Wisconsin education clauses are each of intermediate strength
and specificity, compared to other states. See OHIO CONST. art. VI, § 2 (“The general
assembly shall . . . secure a thorough and efficient system of common schools throughout
the State . . . .”); WIS. CONST. art. X, § 3 (“The legislature shall provide by law for the
establishment of district schools, which shall be as nearly uniform as practicable; and such
schools shall be free and without charge for tuition to all children . . . .”).
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least think we know): judges’ political views and policy preferences weigh
on their decisionmaking and affect their willingness to substitute their
judgment for that of the legislature.
IV. WHERE SHOULD COURTS DRAW THE LINE?
The approaches followed in the examples above are not, in my view,
representative of the proper relationship between the branches of
government. It is basic civics that the legislature is charged with making the
law, the executive branch with carrying out and enforcing the law, and the
judiciary with interpreting the law.180 Yet it is difficult to explain cases like
Rose and Brigham as merely “interpreting” the law. Likewise, a court has
arguably failed to interpret the law when it sidesteps an issue as nonjusticiable, as the courts did in Edgar and Sundlun.181
I have argued in the past for what I have described as a “middle
ground” approach, which I believe better balances the competing
responsibilities of each branch of state government.182 Professor Bauries
has described this as a “passive dialogic” approach because it involves a
back-and-forth between the court and the legislature but puts an outer limit
on the court’s ability to make public policy or otherwise command specific
legislative action.183 Under this approach the court could find a school
funding system unconstitutional, but would refrain from ordering a specific
remedy that pushes the court into the realm of policymaking.
My overall proposition was simple: each branch of government
should stay within its own lane. It is the legislature’s job to make policy. It
is the court’s job to interpret the laws and determine if the legislature is

180. See, e.g., Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 488 (1923) (“To the legislative
department has been committed the duty of making laws, to the executive the duty of
executing them, and to the judiciary the duty of interpreting and applying them in cases
properly brought before the courts.”); Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 46
(1825) (“[T]he legislature makes, the executive executes, and the judiciary construes the law
. . .”).
181. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 178 (1803) (“So if a law be in
opposition to the constitution; . . . the court must determine which of these conflicting rules
governs the case. This is of the very essence of judicial duty.”).
182. See generally Rethinking, supra note 3, at 597–607 (discussing the role of the
judiciary branch in relation to school finance).
183. See Bauries, supra note 9, at 725 & n.129, 727–28. See generally Michael Heise,
Preliminary Thoughts on the Virtues of the Passive Dialogue, 34 AKRON L. REV. 73, 76–84
(2000) (providing a detailed description and examples of “passive judicial participation”
and “active judicial participation”).
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meeting its constitutional mandate. When courts go beyond that, they
exceed both their proper role and their institutional competence.184
This does not mean that a court should never find a system
unconstitutional. To the contrary, if the citizens’ constitutional rights are
not being enforced, courts must “say what the law is and . . . direct the
popularly elected officials back to the proper course.”185 However, the
court should be mindful to avoid both types of activism seen in school
finance cases. The first occurs when a court goes beyond the plain
meaning of the constitutional provision the court is considering. The
second, which is no less significant, occurs when a court answers questions
or decides issues not properly before it by going beyond the scope of the
case or controversy presented by the pleadings.
How does one balance the proper roles of each branch? I offered
some basic guidelines. First, a court “should examine the constitutional
text and determine . . . whether their state’s constitution sets a quality
standard.”186 Second, if the state constitution sets a quality standard, the
court should “determine what that standard is, and whether the state’s
system meets its burden.”187 The court has the duty to review legislative acts
and determine the limitations or requirements of the state constitution. It
is a court’s duty “to declare all acts contrary to the manifest tenor of the
Constitution void.”188 A court should not abandon that duty to determine
whether or not the legislature has complied with the state constitution.189
Finally, I have argued that courts should limit their decisions to the
question of constitutionality and should be wary of imposing court-ordered
remedies.190 When courts fashion remedies for a statewide school finance
system, they run the risk of setting substantive public policy in the areas of
education, taxation, and spending. Yet courts lack the authority to exercise
184. See Rethinking, supra note 3, at 597–98 (“Judges . . . are trained and work in the
interpretation of law—not in the formation of public policy. School finance is not—nor
should it be—a judge’s area of expertise.”).
185. Thro, supra note 10, at 528; see also DuRant, supra note 147, at 535 (“The
fundamental duty of the judiciary is to say what the law is rather than what the law should
be.”).
186. Rethinking, supra note 3, at 605.
187. Id.
188. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 87, at 466.
189. See Comm. for Educ. Rights v. Edgar, 672 N.E.2d 1178, 1203 (Ill. 1996)
(Freeman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“[T]he judicial role of construing
the constitution and determining if it has been violated is essential to our form of
government.”).
190. Rethinking, supra note 3, at 605 (“Limiting decisions to the issue of
constitutionality—and not remedies—would help courts restore the proper balance of
judicial authority.”).
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legislative powers, and they lack the institutional competence to make the
policy decisions involved in reforming an education system.
William Thro has proposed that courts go a step further than this but
stay within a similar framework. Rather than abstaining from remediation
altogether, Thro argues that courts should leave remedies to the other
branches of government, but that courts should give guidance to those
branches on how to remedy the violation.191 Professor Bauries has called
this an “active dialogic” approach.192 Under this approach, a court would
essentially find a system unconstitutional, then explain the changes that
would be necessary to bring the system into compliance.193
While there is a difference between the “passive dialogic” and “active
dialogic” approaches, they are really two sides of the same coin. Each is
more respectful of the separation of powers than the alternative path of a
court-ordered remedy. Thus, both Professor Bauries and Professor
Joshua Weishart have argued that different strands of the “dialogic”
approach converge toward “a rough consensus that, once the merits are
adjudicated, courts should abstain from ordering or compelling any
specific, judge-made remedial measures, but should instead engage in
dialog with the coordinate branches to encourage reform.”194

A.

Do Courts Need to Prescribe a Remedy in Order to Effect Change?

From a plaintiff’s perspective, one practical problem with my
proposed approach (or even with Thro’s more “active” approach) is that it
does not provide for a strong remedy if the legislature refuses to improve
an unconstitutional system. As Professor Bauries pointed out, this
approach does not “address what the judiciary’s proper role might be if the
state legislature were to fail to act to remedy its own violation of the state
constitution.”195

191. See Thro, supra note 10, at 550–52.
192. Bauries, supra note 9, at 726 (discussing Thro’s “active dialogic” approach).
193. See Thro, supra note 10, at 552. Thro’s approach is similar to my own, and his
writings obviously influenced my thinking about this subject. I would argue, however, that
“admonishing” a legislature to act, while telling the legislature what actions would be
acceptable, also intrudes upon the legislative function. Although this is less of an intrusion
than court-imposed education or spending policies, as a legislator, I find those outcomes to
be separated only by degree. I do not view a proverbial sword hanging over the legislature’s
head—complete with a judicially-recommended escape hatch—as philosophically distinct
from the court ordering its own remedy.
194. Joshua E. Weishart, Equal Liberty in Proportion, 59 WM. & MARY L. REV. 215,
273 (2017) (quoting Bauries, supra note 9, at 733).
195. Bauries, supra note 9, at 727.
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This is a fair criticism. However, there are limits to each branch’s
authority. The separation of powers aims to divide responsibilities in order
to protect the people from overreach and to ensure that no one branch is
superior to the others.196 I believe that it is important to maintain that
balance of powers. If there must be a dividing line between activism and
restraint, I land on the side of maintaining this division and stopping any
one branch from subsuming the roles of the others.
Many people undoubtedly draw that line in a different place than I
do. It bears emphasizing that the framers of the various state constitutions
did envision mechanisms for resolving breakdowns in the political system.
Those mechanisms involve public pressure from legislators’ constituents,
criticism by citizens or the press, and regular elections where legislators are
judged (at least in part) for their responsiveness to such issues.
Make no mistake, a state supreme court finding that the school
finance system is unconstitutional creates substantial pressure to improve
the state’s system. Most legislators are responsive to such pressures (and
even less significant pressures than those presented here). Indeed,
successful school finance lawsuits generally have had a significant, positive
effect on their states’ funding, whether due to court orders or political
pressures.197 The response may not be precisely what the plaintiffs (or even
the courts) want, but a finding of unconstitutionality spurs action.
Some may take issue with this and doubt my conclusions. Recent
scholarship has suggested, for example, that “[i]t is not enough to find a
violation of [a state’s] education clause. To ensure real change, the court
must prescribe a remedy.”198 To this, I respond that I have faith in our
political system, at least when schools and education are involved. These
issues resonate strongly with voters. Candidates who ignore systemic
problems with the education system do so at their own political peril.

196. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 320 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961) (“[A]ll the power surrendered by the people is submitted to the administration of a
single government; and the usurpations are guarded against by a division of the government
into distinct and separate departments.”).
197. See, e.g., Rethinking, supra note 3, at 584 (noting that according to econometric
analysis, “in states that have found their school finance systems unconstitutional,
subsequent reforms have led to a 23 percent average increase over what would have
occurred . . . .”); see also Rothstein, supra note 42, at 73.
198. Lauren A. Webb, Educational Opportunity for All: Reducing Intradistrict
Funding Disparities, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2169, 2204 (2017) (alteration in original).
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B. Ohio’s Experience and the Middle Ground
As a partial rebuttal to critics of the “passive” approach, I point to
Ohio’s experiences following DeRolph v. State, in which the Ohio
Supreme Court found the state’s funding system unconstitutional.199 The
case was controversial, as many of these cases undoubtedly are, and I do
not seek to re-litigate its merits here.200 However, I believe that DeRolph
approaches the “middle ground” that I have proposed, and DeRolph
could serve as an example to other courts.
DeRolph was an adequacy challenge brought in the 1990s by a
coalition of Ohio school districts and individuals.201 In prior decades, the
Ohio Supreme Court had already defined the contours of the “thorough
and efficient” standard found in the state’s education clause.202 In the
1920s, the court held that maintaining a thorough and efficient system of
public education was a statewide purpose, rather than a local one.203 Under
this precedent, school districts could not be “starved for funds” or “lack[]
teachers, buildings, or equipment.”204 The court also had indicated in the
1970s that the state legislature has broad discretion in enacting a school
finance system, but that the court would have a duty to declare a funding
scheme invalid if it did not meet the requirements of the Ohio
Constitution.205 Thus, prior to hearing DeRolph in the 1990s, the Ohio
Supreme Court had already determined that the state constitution sets a
quality standard and gave some contours as to what that standard includes.
199. 677 N.E.2d 733, 737 (Ohio 1997) [hereinafter DeRolph I].
200. Arguments against the majority’s holding are found in Chief Justice Thomas
Moyer’s dissents to DeRolph I and DeRolph II. Moyer argued that the majority’s decisions
were “legally unwarranted and inappropriate.” DeRolph v. State, 728 N.E.2d 993, 1035
(Ohio 2000) (Moyer, C.J., dissenting) [hereinafter DeRolph II]. In addition to presenting
separation of powers concerns, Chief Justice Moyer noted that much of the evidence
presented was anecdotal and not systematic. “[P]roblems in individual schools do not . . .
demonstrate a failure of the statewide system of common schools as a whole.” Id. at 1031.
201. DeRolph I, 677 N.E.2d at 734.
202. See OHIO CONST. art. VI, § 2. The state’s education clause requires that “The
General Assembly shall . . . secure a thorough and efficient system of common schools
throughout the State . . . .”
203. See Miller v. Korns, 140 N.E. 773, 776 (Ohio 1923) (stating that Ohio’s thorough
and efficient clause “calls for the upbuilding of a system of schools throughout the state,
and the attainment of efficiency and thoroughness in that system is thus expressly made a
purpose, not local, not municipal, but state-wide”).
204. Id.
205. See Bd. of Educ. v. Walter, 390 N.E.2d 813, 823 (Ohio 1979) (“One of the basic
functions of the courts under our system of separation of powers is to compel the other
branches of government to conform to the basic law.”) (quoting State ex rel. Scott v.
Masterson, 183 N.E.2d 376, 379 (Ohio 1962)).
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In the first of several decisions in DeRolph, the Ohio Supreme Court
recognized that courts have a duty to determine whether a challenged
scheme complies with the state constitution.206 From there, the court
reiterated that Ohio’s education clause imposes a quality standard. The
court applied its prior precedent defining “thorough and efficient.”207
The Ohio Supreme Court next determined whether Ohio’s school
finance system met the burden of the “thorough and efficient” standard.
Based upon the factual record, the court found that many districts were
“starved for funds” or lacked teachers, buildings, or equipment.208 The
court also concluded that some plaintiff districts could not provide the
basic resources necessary to educate their students, including textbooks,
and that this could lead to poor academic performance.209
Thus, the DeRolph court found Ohio’s school funding system
unconstitutional.210 As the court explained, a “thorough and efficient
system of common schools includes facilities in good repair and the
supplies, materials, and funds necessary to maintain these facilities in a
safe manner . . . .”211 Put simply, the court held that the legislature had a
duty to provide Ohio students with the opportunity for an adequate
education, and that it was not meeting that burden.212 Although the court
took the unusual step of staying its decision and retaining jurisdiction, it
did not demand specific legislation in response.213
The approach followed by the DeRolph court avoided the
jurisprudential extremes seen in cases like Brigham and Rose, on one
hand, and Edgar and Sundlun, on the other. The court did not sidestep its
responsibility—it held Ohio’s system unconstitutional—but it was careful
206. See DeRolph I, 677 N.E.2d at 737 (“[T]he function of the judiciary in deciding
constitutional questions is not one which it is at liberty to decline.”).
207. See id. at 747 (“A thorough and efficient system of common schools includes
facilities in good repair and the supplies, materials, and funds necessary to maintain these
facilities in a safe manner . . . .”).
208. Id. at 745.
209. Id. at 744.
210. Id. at 737 (“[T]he current legislation fails to provide for a thorough and efficient
system of common schools, in violation of Section 2, Article VI of the Ohio
Constitution.”).
211. Id. at 747.
212. See Martha S. West, Equitable Funding of Public Schools Under State
Constitutional Law, 2 J. GENDER, RACE & JUST. 279, 291 (1999).
213. See DeRolph I, 677 N.E.2d at 747 (“The trial court is to retain jurisdiction until
the legislation is enacted and in effect, taking such action as may be necessary to ensure
conformity with this opinion.”); see also id. at n.10 (“We grant plenary jurisdiction to the
trial court to enforce our decision. This authority includes the right to petition this court for
guidance, if the need arises.”).
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not to engage in the judicial lawmaking undertaken by some other states’
courts.
Was DeRolph a decision without a remedy? Some have argued that
it was.214 The Ohio Supreme Court issued four rulings over the course of
five years, and ultimately relinquished jurisdiction without finding that the
system had complied with the state’s education clause.215 The legislature
made substantial improvements, but it did not undertake the “complete
systemic overhaul” envisioned by the court.216
I believe, however, that the Ohio Supreme Court largely achieved its
goals. The court left it to the legislature to remedy the state’s school
funding system, rather than ordering specific spending or other mandates.
Yet it is beyond serious dispute that the court’s rulings spurred substantial
legislative action. The legislature responded to the court’s initial decision
with a flurry of activity, including a new funding formula, increased
investment in school facilities, and important accountability measures.217
By the time the court relinquished jurisdiction in the case, Ohio had
instituted a rational process for determining the cost of an adequate
education.218 The state also put mechanisms in place to even out the
disparities caused by the property tax system.219
Was this enough? Or did the lack of a court-ordered remedy render
the DeRolph litigation a failure? There will always be arguments over
increased funding, and the question of whether more can be done. It is
214. See, e.g., Christen Spears Hignett, Comment, Ohio’s Public School Funding
System: The Unanswered Questions and the Unresolved Problems of DeRolph, 33 CAP.
U. L. REV. 739, 763 (2005) (arguing that neither the legislature nor the courts “has shown a
meaningful intent to solve the problem” of school funding in Ohio); Sonja Ralston Elder,
Note, Standing Up to Legislative Bullies: Separation of Powers, State Courts, and
Educational Rights, 57 DUKE L.J. 755, 778 (2007) (claiming that “judicial restraint did not
improve the education of the generation of children who attended these schools . . .”).
215. See DeRolph v. State, 780 N.E.2d 529 (2002) [hereinafter DeRolph IV];
DeRolph v. State, 754 N.E.2d 1184, (2001) [hereinafter DeRolph III]; DeRolph II, 728
N.E.2d 993 (Ohio 2000); DeRolph I, 677 N.E.2d 733. See generally Adequate Education,
supra note 19, at 101–39 (discussing all four of the Ohio Supreme Court’s decisions in the
DeRolph litigation, as well as the legislative response to each).
216. See DeRolph IV, 780 N.E.2d at 530; see also Adequate Education, supra note
19, at 146 (concluding that as a matter of case law, “the mandates of DeRolph I and II
remained unfulfilled” at the time the court relinquished jurisdiction in the case).
217. See Adequate Education, supra note 19, at 113–18 (discussing the legislative
response to DeRolph I).
218. Adequate Education, supra note 19, at 148 (“[Ohio] now has a rational formula
for determining the cost of a basic education, and has programs in place to fund those
costs. Ohio also now has programs in place to even out the disparities caused by the
property tax system.”).
219. Adequate Education, supra note 19, at 148.
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undeniable, however, that the DeRolph litigation left a lasting legacy across
Ohio.
Perhaps even more important than changes to the funding formula
was the creation of the Ohio School Facilities Commission (now part of
the Ohio Facilities Construction Commission).220 The Ohio Supreme
Court’s initial decision focused on unsafe and inadequate facilities and the
need for billions of dollars in upgrades or new construction.221 Because of
the changes made after DeRolph, Ohio has largely rebuilt its schools.
Post-DeRolph Ohio has invested more than $11.8 billion in additional
facilities spending. This has resulted in the construction or renovation of
nearly 1,200 school buildings across the state. To put that in perspective,
in 284 districts out of roughly 615 districts statewide, every building was
either renovated or was newly constructed in the years following
DeRolph.222 This is significant and goes to the heart of the court’s ruling.
In fact, one of the justices who formed the DeRolph majority confirmed
for me in personal conversations that he regards the state’s long-term
investments in facilities a major victory for the DeRolph plaintiffs and a
substantial improvement for the state of Ohio.
This may not be a perfect result, but it is far better than one would
believe from reading the academic literature alone. As a policymaker, I
find that the rhetoric often does not match reality. It is simply not accurate,
for example, to say that the Ohio Supreme Court “gave up and acquiesced
to chronic legislative failure”223 or that the court’s judgment was “not
enforceable” and “meaningless.”224 In fact, I think almost the opposite is
true. The DeRolph court took the procedurally unusual step of keeping

220. See OHIO FACILITIES CONSTR. COMM’N, Overview and History,
https://ofcc.ohio.gov/Home/Overview-History [https://perma.cc/3NY7-WFWR] (“The
Ohio Facilities Construction Commission is responsible for guiding capital projects for
state agencies, state-supported universities and community colleges, and Ohio’s
comprehensive public K-12 school construction and renovation program.”).
221. See DeRolph I, 677 N.E.2d 733, 742–46 (Ohio 1997); Adequate Education,
supra note 19, at 105–06 (discussing significant facilities-related problems among the
DeRolph plaintiff districts, including health and safety concerns in Perry County schools).
222. See OHIO SENATE MAJORITY CAUCUS, EDUCATION QUICK FACTS (June 2018)
(on file with author).
223. Davis, supra note 6, at 132. Some commentators are even more animated. See,
e.g., Elder, supra note 215, at 786 (“In Ohio and New Jersey, the courts’ unwillingness to
push the legislatures harder has condemned millions of children to an education that is less
than they deserve based on their state constitutions.”).
224. See Hignett, supra note 215, at 763 (quoting William Phillis, Mr. DeRolph Goes
to Washington, THE OHIO COAL. FOR EQUITY & ADEQUACY OF SCH. FUNDING,
http://www.ohiocoalition.org (last visited October 20, 2003)).
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jurisdiction over the case for several years.225 Doing so allowed the court to
engage in a back-and-forth with the legislature until significant progress had
been made and the makeup of the court became more conservative. This
back-and-forth “dialogue,” involving several court decisions and multiple
legislative responses, led to real-world results for students.
This is not to say that authors of the academic literature intend to
mislead. To the contrary, I assume that most observers believe what they
say about Ohio’s school funding system, or those of the other states that
they write about. I also believe there is room for continued improvement
in Ohio’s school funding system. However, the school funding formula is
updated every two years, and these changes are often significant. State
funding for K-12 education has increased by more than 110 percent in the
years following DeRolph, more than twice the rate of inflation.226 There are
dozens of other bills related to education introduced in each two-year
legislative cycle, and many of those are passed and signed into law. I see
those on a daily basis while most people outside the legislature would not,
unless they dedicated themselves to following such developments full-time.
Few people are able to do so, and in my estimation few who study this
issue see the full picture, no matter how much time they put into it.

C.

What Does the “Middle Ground” Mean for Emerging Education
Litigation?

I continue to believe that the middle ground approach is more
respectful of the separation of powers than the approaches followed by the
courts in Brigham, Rose, or McDuffy. I also believe that it is more
supportive of the peoples’ constitutional rights than the approach used in
cases like Edgar and Sundlun. Courts should say what the law is; that is the
very essence of judicial review. Yet they also must remember the
constraints of their role, and not venture beyond either their constitutional
authority or their institutional competence.
What does this mean for the next generation of education lawsuits?
Where there are statutory questions involved, the court should adhere to
the normal principles of construction and apply the laws passed by their
225. This step was so unusual, in fact, that on a motion for clarification one of the
Justices argued that there was no longer a case or controversy properly before the court.
See DeRolph v. State, 678 N.E.2d 886, 890 (Ohio 1997) (Cook, J., dissenting) (“There
remains nothing more for this . . . court to do. . . . [U]pon the enactment of new laws for
school funding, new challenges may be brought.”).
226. See OHIO SENATE MAJORITY CAUCUS, supra note 222 (stating that state funds for
K-12 education increased 110.1 percent between fiscal year 1997 and fiscal year 2018,
while inflation increased by 52.5 percent over that same period).
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respective legislatures. In the constitutional context, courts must remain
mindful of their limitations. Do the states’ various education clauses
require specific outcomes for challenges to educational minutes, advanced
placement course availability, or teacher tenure laws? Do they prohibit a
certain level of “overregulation” of public schools or call into question a
statutory cap on charter schools? I am skeptical that these questions
generally rise to the level of being constitutional issues. I am even more
skeptical that courts have the expertise or institutional competence to
determine sound public policy in such areas. I am most skeptical of the
notion that courts should be setting such policies, rather than the branches
elected by the people to make those decisions.
I nonetheless recognize that states’ statutory and constitutional
provisions are different and that facts vary from case-to-case. That is why I
believe courts should follow the roadmap that I set out. This roadmap
serves as a natural constraint, keeping the courts within their proper role,
while providing for judicial review that is robust enough for the courts to
fulfill that role.
Courts should not be outcome-oriented or work backwards from a
desired result. Rather, they should ask themselves whether the relevant
provisions set a standard that must be met by the legislature. If so, they
should determine that standard. Then they should decide whether the
state has met that burden. When these steps are taken out of order—when
a court picks its desired policy outcome and then works its way backwards
to justify its decision—it is intruding on the policymaking role of the
legislature.
V. CONCLUSION
Education is one of the most important functions of state and local
governments. The overwhelming majority of legislators that I work with
would agree with that assessment, and I doubt that legislators in other
states are much different. Education is the foundation upon which our
society is built. It leads to upward mobility. It is one of the building blocks
of the American Dream.
Both state and local governments devote significant resources to
educating our children, and education reforms often lead state
policymakers’ legislative agendas. Nonetheless, more than forty state
governments have faced legal challenges to their respective school funding
systems.227 Plaintiffs in these cases have generally attempted to increase
funding of primary and secondary education and to decrease the inter227.

See Chia & Seo, supra note 18, at 126.
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district inequalities that stem from a reliance on local property taxes.
Plaintiffs have met varying levels of success.228 Where they have succeeded,
however, subsequent reforms have generally led to increased funding and
greater funding equity among school districts.229
As discussed above, school finance litigation poses some unique
questions related to the separation of powers and the proper roles of each
branch of government. School finance cases have often failed to balance
the principles of judicial review and judicial restraint.230 Some courts have
abdicated their responsibility to provide judicial review.231 Others have
gone beyond their states’ constitutional mandates to engage in
policymaking that is properly left to state legislatures.232 Some scholars have
even surveyed the case law and found no correlation between state
constitutional provisions regarding the separation of powers and state
courts’ decisions to reach the merits in school finance litigation.233
As a state legislator, I believe that courts can and should follow a
more predictable method of deciding these cases. Courts should provide
judicial review when the relevant provisions require it. Courts that do
provide judicial review should stay within the bounds of the constitution,
and their decisions should be based on the constitutional language and the
facts of the case. Courts should not engage in policymaking that goes
beyond the scope of their authority or expertise.
This article recommends that courts balance the responsibility of
judicial review with the principle of judicial restraint. I have set out a
helpful roadmap for courts to follow, not just in school finance cases, but
also in other education-related litigation. Each branch of state government
has a role to play. Courts should provide judicial review where
appropriate; indeed, it is their duty to do so. However, a court should
strive to perform its duty without intruding upon the rightful
responsibilities of the legislature and the governor. I believe that the
roadmap outlined above balances these concerns.
Courts should not engage in policymaking, which is beyond their
constitutional role and their expertise. Nor should they shy away from

228. See id.
229. See, e.g., id. at 134.
230. See Rethinking, supra note 3, at 606 (“[S]chool finance cases have proven
particularly troublesome in this regard.”); Thro, supra note 10, at 529 (stating that state
courts “have mostly failed” to achieve the proper balance between judicial review and
judicial restraint in school finance litigation).
231. Thro, supra note 10, at 530.
232. Id. at 532.
233. Bauries, supra note 9, at 701.
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enforcing the peoples’ rights. If they adhere to the roadmap set out above,
they can be catalysts for change without overstepping their bounds.
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